This paper develops a dynamic game model of an asymmetric oligopoly with a renewable resource to reconsider welfare effects of increases in the number of firms. We show that increasing not only the number of inefficient firms but also that of efficient firms reduces welfare, which sharply contrasts to a static outcome. It is discussed that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies plays a decisive role in this finding.
Introduction
Is increasing competition, i.e., an exogenous increase in the number of firms, beneficial to social welfare in an oligopoly? This is one of the primary interests in economics and there is a considerable literature based on static Cournot-Nash models. When all the oligopolistic firms have an identically constant marginal cost and no fixed cost, increasing the number of firms benefits welfare. However, it is stringent whether welfare improves as a result of increasing competition under asymmetric costs among firms. In a seminal work, Lahiri and Ono (1988, Proposition 2, p. 1201) find that 'national welfare increases if a firm with a sufficiently low share is removed from the market.' This result has long had a great influence on the policymaking of competition.
Are these results still valid even in a resource oligopoly as well? To give an answer, this paper constructs a differential game model of a renewable and open access resource oligopoly. A typical example is a transboundary fishery. Suppose that efficient Northern firms and inefficient Southern firms compete in not only the world output market but also global fishery. In such a world, there is no world government and thus extraction is completely decentralized by private firms, the number of which is fixed even though the resource has open access. Within this framework, we prove that an increase in the number of efficient firms harms welfare as is opposed to the static result. Therefore, it straightforwardly from this result that 'helping any firms reduces welfare.' What is worth noting is that our results need no assumption on the initial market share of efficient firms.
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It is the closed-loop property of feedback strategies that plays a central role in our arguments. While closed-loop effects are a priori absent in any static analysis, they are quite relevant in dynamic environments, particularly in dynamic games. Our result is an example where the closed-loop effects can dominate the static effects, which yields a sharp contrast between the static and dynamic outcomes.
We are not the first to identify the role of closed-loop properties of feedback strategies in dynamic games. Constructing a differential game model of a renewable resource duopoly, Benchekroun (2003) demonstrates that a unilateral production restriction on a firm can decrease the resource stock. Allowing for an arbitrary number of (symmetric) firms in the same model, Benchekroun (2008) proves that increasing the number of firms reduces the resource stock and the industry output in the long-run. Lohoues (2006) introduces heterogeneity in marginal cost and the number of firms in the Benchekroun (2008) model and characterizes the feedback Nash equilibrium. One of Lohoues' (2006) notable results is that the low-cost firm's feedback strategy exhibits jumps in the presence of asymmetric costs. However, he is mainly interested in characterizing the equilibrium, leaving comparative statics/dynamics out.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 characterizes the feedback Nash equilibria. Section 4 states and discusses the main results.
Section 5 concludes the paper. The appendices prove the results in the main text.
A model
Consider an oligopoly consisting of m ≥ 1 efficient firms with zero marginal cost and n ≥ 1 inefficient firms with a positive marginal cost c. Fixed costs are assumed away.
During production, firms extract a renewable resource with the following dynamics:
where S is a stock of the resource, x i represents an efficient firm's output and x j represents an inefficient firm's output.
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The parameter k denotes a natural growth rate of the resource. Assuming linear inverse demand
where p is the price, each firm's profit maximization problem is formulated as
where r > 0 denotes a constant rate of discount.
Feedback Nash equilibria
We seek stationary feedback strategies of this dynamic game. Stationary feedback strategies are a decision rule such that each firm's extraction is a function of the current resource stock only: x i = x i (S) and x j = x j (S) with x i (S) ≥ 0 and x j (S) ≥ 0 for any S ≥ 0, and We employ a technique by Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Shimomura (1991) to derive the feedback Nash equilibrium.
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It begins by defining firm i's Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
where V i (·) is a value function of firm i:
Maximizing the right-hand side of (2) and assuming that all the efficient (resp. inefficient) firms choose x i (S) (resp. x j (S)), we have the first-order condition of the efficient firms:
. Substituting this into (2) yields an identity in S:
in view of the symmetry in each group of firms. Differentiating both sides with respect to S and rearranging terms, we have an auxiliary differential equation:
Applying the same procedure to the inefficient firms' problem, we have a counterpart of firm j:
Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies are determined by solving the system of differential equations (3) and (4).
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However, since it is almost impossible to explicitly solve the system, we focus on linear strategies:
α i , α j , β j and β j are undetermined coefficients. Under these specifications, (3) and (4)
which are rewritten as 
The four coefficients are determined as follows. First, α i and α j are determined so that the terms multiplied by S are zero, i.e.,
substituting α i = α j = α into either ∆ i = 0 or ∆ j = 0 and solving the resulting equation
for α, we obtain
On the other hand, β i and β j are determined through the system of equations obtained by setting the constant terms in (7) and (8) to zero:
The solution to this system is
Substituting (9) into (10) and (11), the closed form of β i and β j is computed. Note here that α = 0 corresponds to the static Cournot-Nash outcome because (10) and (11) show
In the subsequent arguments, we restrict attention to the case where both types of firms employ an interior feedback strategy since there is nothing new in the case where static outputs are chosen. This is justified by assuming that the initial resource stock
.
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In addition, we assume r → 0 since it is too difficult to facilitate analysis for an arbitrary r. 8 Under these restrictions, the coefficients obtained above are
Assuming that a is sufficiently larger compared to c to ensure β i < 0, substitution of (12)- (14) into x i (S) = αS + β i and x j (S) = αS + β j yields the feedback strategy of each firm as follows.
Roughly speaking, (15) and (16) state that feedback strategy outputs are zero (resp. static output) if S is sufficiently small (resp. large) and linearly increasing in S if it is in a certain closed interval.
We draw two notes on the equilibrium strategies above. First, each firm voluntarily stops extraction if the resource stock is low enough. That is, 'firms prefer to let the asset grow and refrain from any exploitation as long as the stock has not reached its maturity 6 See Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Dockner and Long (1993) . More recent examples to impose the same assumptions are found in Itaya and Shimomura (2001) and Rubio and Casino (2002) .
7 'Interior' here means that α is non-zero. 8 Setting r → 0 is often observed in the existing literature as well, e.g., Fershtman and Kamien (1987), Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Dockner and Long (1993) . The intuitions behind these jumps in the efficient firms' equilibrium output are as follows. Suppose first that S is small enough to satisfy S < −β j /α. Then, the efficient firms find it more profitable to wait for resource accumulation than to begin producing.
If they produce positive output at such a small resource, they immediately run out of the resource and can not produce any more since feedback strategies require that x i (0) = 0.
Thus, the efficient firms voluntarily quit production until S exceed −β j /α. On the other hand, the jump at
is explained as follows.
When the resource stock reaches this level, the inefficient firms switch their output from αS + β j to the static Cournot level. Given this, it is more profitable for the efficient firms to choose a larger output between αS + β i and static Cournot output. Accordingly, the efficient firms also abandon αS + β i and choose static Cournot output. For these reasons, the efficient firms' equilibrium output exhibits two jumps.
The main results
This section establishes the main results. Let us first consider the effect of an increase in the number of efficient firms on steady state welfare. For this purpose, define steady state welfare U as follows.
where CS denotes consumer surplus, π i is each efficient firm's profit and π j is each inefficient firm's profit. Rearrangements after (17) use the steady state condition thaṫ
Based on preliminary analyses so far, we can state a striking effect of increasing the number of efficient firms:
Proposition 1. An increase in the number of efficient firms reduces steady state welfare.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In order to understand implications of Proposition 1 better, we prove a useful result.
Lemma 1. The steady state in the feedback Nash equilibrium involves over-exploitation of the resource as compared to social optimum.
Proof. Social optimum in our context is defined by the solution to the following welfaremaximizing problem:
where U (x i , x j ) is the sum of consumer surplus and aggregate profits:
Since this is a single agent's optimal control problem, it can be solved with a Hamiltonian:
, where λ is a costate variable. The maximum principle
gives the following first-order conditions:
It naturally follow from (19) and (20) that x j = 0, i.e., the social optimum drives inefficient firms out of the market and that mx i = a − λ. Substituting this into (22), the equilibrium system reduces to 
accelerating over-exploitation.
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Taking into account this decrease in S, all firms reduce output since feedback strategies are increasing in S (recall that x i (S) = x j (S) = α > 0).
This can be called a closed-loop effect. Because all firms reduce output, the industry output and consumer surplus will inevitably decrease.
Since the static effect positively affects welfare and the closed-loop effect negatively affects welfare, the total effect seems ambiguous. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 states that the latter effect necessarily dominates the former effect, which unambiguously results in welfare losses. In other words, the intertemporally strategic interaction through the change in the resource stock plays a dominant role and outweighs the potentially beneficial effect.
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Proposition 1 straightforwardly leads to:
Corollary 1. An increase in the number of inefficient firms reduces steady state welfare.
A remark is attached to this result. In Lahiri and Ono's (1988) argument, increasing the number of inefficient firms has two competing effects. One is a procompetitive effect and the other is a profit-shifting effect from efficient firms to inefficient firms. Their conclusion that 'helping minor firms reduces welfare' rests on an additional assumption that the efficient firms' share is initially large enough. Unless this is satisfied, increasing the number of inefficient firms still benefits welfare. In contrast, both Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 need no such assumption. What is relevant is that increasing competition reduces the total output through the closed-loop effects of feedback strategies.
At this stage, someone may be interested in what would happen if static Cournot outputs were to be chosen.
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This confirms the conventional wisdom:
12 Even in the absence of oligopolistic interactions in the output market, over-exploitation easily occurs. See Chapter 12 of Docknet et al. (2000) . 13 It is possible to prove a result closely related to Proposition 1, which asserts that an increase in c reduces welfare, i.e., dU/dc < 0. While detailed calculations are omitted, the final outcome is
A rise in c directly yields a larger market share of efficient firms but lowers welfare. This parallels Proposition 1.
14 As shown in Benchekroun (2003 Benchekroun ( , 2008 ) in a context of symmetric oligopoly, the steady state associ-
Proposition 2. If static Cournot outputs were to be chosen, an increase in the number
of efficient firms raises steady state welfare.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This result clearly convinces us that a result parallel to Proposition 1 would no longer be the case if static outputs were to be chosen. This is because static outputs have no closed-loop property, i.e., no firm adjusts output to a change in S. In this case, only the static effect prevails and thus increasing the number of efficient firms unambiguously improves welfare. On the other hand, our results cast a serious doubt on practical competition policies.
Concluding remarks
It has been tacitly believed that increasing the number of efficient firms is always welfare- pursued generality, it is our future research agenda to explore the validity and generality of our results by relaxing these assumptions.
Appendix A. Feedback strategies through the guessing method
While the main text employs the Tsutsui-Mino-Shimomura approach, this appendix derives the feedback strategy by assuming quadratic value functions. Maximizing the righthand side of firm i's HJB equation with respect to x i and using the symmetry in each group of firms, we obtain the first-order condition of efficient firms:
Inefficient firms' counterpart is
From (23) and (24), feedback strategies are solved as
Supposing that each firm's value function is quadratic in S so that
and (23) and (24) become
Substituting these into the original HJB equations, we have an identity of efficient firms
and of inefficient firms
Equating the terms multiplied by S 2 in both sides of these identities, we can get
Analogously, B i and B j satisfy the system of equations
by equating the terms multiplied by S to zero. Finally, C i and C j are obtained from the constant terms in the HJB equations. Substituting these back into (25) and (26), feedback strategies are derived as in (15) and (16) . Note that A i = A j = A = 0 corresponds to the static Cournot-Nash outputs.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiating (18) with respect to m, we have
The steady state in whichṠ = kS − m(αS + β i ) − n(αS + β j ) = 0 involves
Substituting this into x j (S) = αS + β j , an inefficient firm's steady state output is
Substituting (12)- (14) into (28) where superscript E denotes the Nash equilibrium.
Thus, differentiating these with respect to m yields Consequently, we have concluded that dU/dm < 0.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
It is convenient to slightly rewrite (18) as follows.
where X ≡ mx i + nx j . Therefore, a change in m induces 
